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Abstract
This paper discusses the philosophy of death and mortality from a transcendental perspective. I first
criticize the metaphysically realistic background assumptions of mainstream analytic approaches to the
philosophy of death. Secondly, I defend a transcendentally idealistic approach, drawing attention to how
the topic of death can be illuminated by means of the notion of the transcendental subject. Thirdly, I
identify a problem in this approach: the transcendental subject needs to recognize its own mortality.
Fourthly, I propose a pragmatist way out of this problem. This, however, is no way out of the general
issue that mortality as a structural element of the human condition provides us with. Rather, pragmatism
(joining forces with transcendental philosophy) can show us a way of living with this condition.1
Introduction: Metaphysical realism and “third-personal” approaches to death and mortality
The naturalistic mainstream approaches in contemporary metaphysics of death, as well as their
applications to ethical issues of death and dying,2 are based on a metaphysically realistic understanding of the
relation between the self and the world. Deaths, according to this picture, are simply natural events in
the  natural  world;  my  own  death  is  no  exception.  Death,  dying,  and  mortality  are  viewed  from  an
objective, “third-personal”, or even theocentric perspective, a “God’s-Eye-View”. This presupposes a
broadly “Aristotelian” conception of metaphysics as a general category theory; death and the mortal
subject fall in their place in the categorial structure of reality. The world in which human selves live and
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die has its “own” ontological structure independently of those selves and their experiential and world-
conceptualizing or -categorizing perspectives.3
I will not criticize Aristotelian conceptions of metaphysics in general. What I will draw attention to is the
frustrating irrelevance of contemporary philosophy of death and mortality based on analytic metaphysics.
Such philosophy of death does not seem to be able to say anything about the human relevance of death,
dying, and mortality. It does not seem to address the ways in which these features of the human condition
are both metaphysically and ethically significant to us.
Consider an analogy. Analytic philosophy of death can be compared to analytic philosophy of religion,
especially the discourse on theodicy. This comparison is illuminating not because these two discourses
would share the same metaphysical views – which they do not, as analytic philosophy of death is typically
atheistic and naturalistic, while analytic theodicy arguments are typically theistic4 – but because both are
irrelevant to the human attempt to live (“toward death”) through our mortal lives that are often full of
suffering. When an analytic metaphysician speaks about the metaphysics of resurrection based on, e.g.,
an “animalist” theory of a “remnant” of a human being that will be preserved by God between someone’s
death and their resurrection, or the possible moral reasons God might have for allowing an atrocity such
as the Holocaust to take place, one can hardly take these as much more than cruel jokes.
To take another example, consider the debates over the harmfulness of death and the question of whether
it would be desirable to be immortal. This dispute on the “tedium” of immortality also ignores the
transcendental level of inquiry, hence ignoring the fundamental difference between our form(s) of life and
that of the imagined immortals that couldn’t die. The parties to such a debate uncritically help themselves
to the entirely unsupported assumption that our concepts of interest, virtue, or meaning(fulness) would
be available to immortals whose lives would be completely different from ours. It requires only a modest
dose of late-Wittgensteinian therapy to note that such an availability assumption is unfounded. Insofar
as the meaning of concepts is rooted in forms of life, we cannot imagine what the relevant concepts
would mean for the “immortals” postulated for the sake of hypothesis, and we are entirely at a loss to
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say whether their lives would be tedious or non-tedious, or whether such a distinction would be applicable
to them at all. The immortals would not have the concepts we do, simply because their lives would be
entirely alien to ours. They would hardly even have a concept of personal identity in the sense we do; nor
could we understand what, say, moral virtues or intellectual achievements would mean for them (or for
us, if our lives were infinite). We can only try to imagine such things from within our own mortal condition,
which is, presumably, both a blessing and a curse.
We are, then, unable to determine whether the imagined immortal life would be desirable for us, as our
lives lack the concept of desirability that would be available to them, and vice versa. In Jonathan Lear’s
terms, our way of being “minded” is completely different from theirs;5 we could as little understand the
immortals as we could understand Wittgenstein’s speaking lion. It is hubristic to suppose that we could,
from the perspective of our form of life structured by finitude and mortality, make any considered
judgments here. This hubris follows from the failure to approach the issue transcendentally, from within
the mortal condition itself. In contrast to the “first-order” question concerning the supposed tedium of
immortality, or lack thereof, the relevant question opening up in a transcendental reflection is a “second-
order” one: the finitude entailed by our mortality is necessary for the possibility of asking whether our
lives are meaningful or meaningless, or inquiring into any possible meaningfulness or meaninglessness in
life. Mortality makes these questions “urgent” to us even if it may also make it impossible to answer them
in any definite way; even more importantly, it makes them possible questions for us to pursue.
Furthermore, consider the welfare comparison calculations presented in the discussions concerning the
harmfulness of death. These are, it seems to me, as much a parody of the “harm” of death manifested in
the horror and anxiety we experience when reflecting on our mortal condition as theodicist speculations
about God’s possible moral reasons for allowing suffering are both comic and terrible from the
perspective of the sufferer.6 The precise nature of the irrelevance of analytic philosophy of death can be
demonstrated by taking a look at how a very different kind of approach, a “first-personal” one, can lead
to philosophical discoveries that are unavailable in the “third-personal” approaches. The main reason for
4
the irrelevance of mainstream (realistic) metaphysics of death is, precisely, the fact that it treats my death
and the deaths of others symmetrically. The fundamental asymmetry we  need  to  deal  with  here  is  only
visible from a transcendental point of view.
Transcendental solipsism and the transcendental subject
The kind of explorations of death we find in the analytic, metaphysically realistic mainstream described
above would, from a Kantian perspective (in contrast to the “Aristotelian” one), amount to little more
than transcendental illusion, Schwärmerei.7 The problem with the approaches in this paradigm is that they
are non-transcendental, presupposing a theocentric perspective ignoring the need to examine the significance
of death from a “first-personal” standpoint. The attempt to occupy the unattainable theocentric
perspective of metaphysical realism is the proton pseudos of the approaches I am criticizing. We should
replace such a misguided approach by a resolutely anthropocentric perspective on human mortality,
exemplified by transcendental philosophies of death, invoking the notion of a transcendental subject.8
Insofar as we adopt such an anthropocentric perspective, we will examine human mortality “from within”
the condition it defines and irreducibly shapes and structures – that is, reflexively and first-personally,
not in an imagined objective way “from above”. This move from theocentrism to anthropocentrism can
be metaphilosophically motivated on the basis of pragmatism seeking to emphasize the need to make the
philosophy of death humanly relevant.9
This is not merely a matter of a pragmatic need. The unattainability of the “God’s-Eye-View” is not a
contingent limitation of the human condition but a necessary transcendental limit; however, this is
something that can be shown or even meaningfully discussed – transcendentally – only from within the
anthropocentric perspective itself, that is, only when we have left behind the futile attempt to occupy the
theocentric perspective. This can be seen as an analogy to Kant’s distinction between appearances and
things in themselves: it is only from the standpoint of Kant’s critical idealism that this distinction – qua
transcendental – arises. If you haven’t adopted that standpoint, you will uncritically believe that
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appearances are things in themselves. That distinction will be available to you only when you have adopted
the transcendental perspective. Moreover, adopting that perspective will, according to Kant, enable us to
get rid of metaphysical  problems that haunt us if  we stick to the desperate attempt to view the world
theocentrically, such as the antinomies. Such considerations provide independent support for the
transcendental approach (but cannot be considered here).
In general, what it means to adopt a transcendental approach to anything, including death and mortality,
is not easily definable, as there are different types of transcendental philosophy available. What I primarily
mean by adopting a transcendental approach can be stated by emphasizing five interconnected, family-
resemblance-like features of transcendental reflection (understood in a broader sense than mere
“transcendental argumentation” cashed out in familiar argument schemas). Such an inquiry (i) is
concerned with necessary conditions for the possibility of certain (humanly given, hence actual) phenomena,
something whose possibility is taken for granted; (ii) by examining such conditions sets limits to those
conditioned phenomena and hence to human possibilities; (iii) engages in a reflexive examination of
phenomena that are only available from within those limits and on the basis of those conditions; (iv)
shows how the relevant phenomena are constituted by the transcendental structures of the relevant
conditions;  and  (v)  locates  the  source  of  such  constitutivity  in  the  activity  of  the transcendental subject
(possibly reconceptualized, or even “naturalized”). For example, a late-Wittgensteinian version of such
transcendental inquiry would be concerned with the necessary conditions for the possibility of linguistic
meaning, would examine the limits of meaning as the limits of what can be said and done within language-
games, would examine meaning and its limits and conditions reflexively from within a human form of
life in which meaning is always already taken for granted, would show how the possibility of meaning is
constituted by our practical engagement in language-games (“meaning is use”), and would reinterpret the
meaning- and world-constituting transcendental self as a social subject engaging in language-use within a
form of life. In any such transcendental inquiry, neither meaning, experience, nor the experienceable
world is just “given” to us in a metaphysically innocent form.
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The metaphysically realistic understanding of death – or of the world in which subjects live and in which
their deaths take place – must therefore be contrasted with a transcendentally idealistic position, according
to which the world is transcendentally dependent on, or constituted by, the structures of subjectivity.
Death is, from a transcendental perspective, an (or, better, the) end of the world rather than simply an event
in the world or something that could be experienced as part of one’s life and whose harmfulness could
be rationally discussed in the way we may discuss the harmfulness of, say, having a headache or being
run over by a bicycle. This is, roughly, how Wittgenstein formulates the matter in the Tractatus,
maintaining that the metaphysical (transcendental) subject is the “limit of the world” instead of being a
thing in, or a part of, the world (“die Grenze, nicht ein Teil der Welt”).10 From a broadly Kantian point of
view, the categorial ontological structure of reality, including the structure in terms of which phenomena
such as death and dying are categorized, is grounded in activities of the transcendental subject. This seems
to hold even if the subject is not ontologically self-standing but is primarily responsible to and for the
other in Emmanuel Levinas’s sense (and constitutively dependent on this responsibility). Even this
primordial ethical relation to another mortal self can be regarded as a transcendental structure of
subjectivity, because in the Levinasian picture infinite ethical responsibility is constitutive of my
subjectivity; it is something that concerns me first and foremost, as I cannot be substituted by anyone
else in this responsibility. Arguably there is, then, a kind of methodological solipsism inevitably involved
in any transcendental philosophy of death and subjectivity, even when the transcendental inquiry focuses
on otherness rather than (in Heideggerian terms) the “mineness” of death.11 On the other hand, from a
solipsistic starting point, the intersubjectivity of death and dying, and of the self, must be transcendentally
examined as well.
However, it is important to avoid construing the transcendental dependence of the world on the
transcendental subject along the lines of any ontological, let alone causal, dependence in any
metaphysically realistic sense. The fatal mistake in metaphysical realists’ criticisms of transcendental
idealism is the assumption that the world and its objective structures would be claimed to be causally or
ontologically dependent on, or “made by”, the subject. No such thing is, of course, claimed by the
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Kantian or Wittgensteinian transcendental philosopher. It is the very objectivity of the objective world
that is constituted by the transcendental activity of the subject. The Kantian transcendental unity of
apperception or the Wittgensteinian metaphysical subject as a “limit” of the world cannot be found
among the worldly objects whose objectivity and givenness (and linguistic representability) they make
possible. The issue of death is fundamental right here precisely because we need to think of the death of
this world-constituting subject as the disappearance of the objectivity of the world itself, and of the world, too – a
disappearance, however, that paradoxically verges on immortality because death is nothing that could
take place in the world.12
Reducing transcendental relations of world-constitution to relations of ontological dependence would
presuppose that we can practice ontology at a level that is more general and inclusive than the level of
transcendental inquiry. However, the very point of engaging in transcendental inquiry is to make ontology
(among other things) possible. Our understanding of ontological categories and relations of
(in)dependence must itself be grounded in a transcendental analysis of our ability to categorize reality at
all. The ontological, in short, must be grounded in the transcendental, rather than the other way round.
The intentional or unintentional misunderstanding of the notion of the transcendental subject – and of
the idea of the transcendental generally – has resulted in a lot of confusion in discussions of death and
subjectivity. Let us, as an example drawn from contemporary debates, take a look at how J.J. Valberg’s
theory of death and the self is criticized by Mark Johnston. The recent books by these two philosophers
are major contributions to the philosophy of death.13
Valberg employs the notion of a personal horizon in his examination of death. It is, he tells us, “only by
being ‘at the center’ of the personal horizon, of the horizon that is ‘mine,’ that something (a human being)
is a ‘subject.’”14 This horizon, however, is, like the Wittgensteinian subject, “nothing in itself”;  it  is  not
among the many horizons there are but “the horizon”,15 and this is the “truth in solipsism”. This
nothingness is a fundamental element of the transcendentality of the horizon. If the horizon were
“something”, a thing in the world, it would no longer be transcendental (though this is not exactly the
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way Valberg expresses his point). It would not play the constitutive role in making the world possible if
it were itself an object or a place in the world.
Things get complicated when Valberg starts to speak about other horizons, all of them claiming
“preeminence” for themselves.16 “In regarding you as a metaphysical equal, I recognize your horizon as
outside my horizon”, he says.17 But this is precisely what is problematic when we consider death. Death
“in the metaphysical sense” is the “cessation of the crucial subject matter, of my horizon”, of “that from
within which the world appears”.18 Valberg argues that “the fact that I will die (in the metaphysical sense)
leaves the totality I call ‘the world’ untouched”, because “the fact of death concerns not the ceasing to
be of anything in that totality, but the ceasing to be of THIS, the horizon of the totality”.19 It is right here,
then, that solipsism is brought into this picture. My horizon’s being “the horizon” makes it “mine”.20
Therefore, the word “my” in these phrases cannot refer “possessively” to the human being I happen to
be.21 Valberg – much more explicitly than Wittgenstein – endorses solipsism, albeit in a deliberately
paradoxical form saying that “we” (all) know it to be true:
In this way, we are all solipsists. What makes my horizon “mine” is that it is the horizon.
[…] Solipsism is a solution to our problem. […] I think we already know it to be true […]
but  we  have  to  become  open  to  what  we  know.  We  have,  in  other  words,  to  discover
philosophically this truth that we already know, the truth of solipsism.22
It is death that “puts us in touch with the truth of solipsism, our own solipsism, in a way that nothing
else does”.23 Here Valberg considers Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, observing that Tractarian solipsism is
concerned with the “horizon or limit of the world”.24 He interprets the relevant sections of the Tractatus
by saying that this horizon – that is, the “self of solipsism” – “is nothing in itself” in the sense that there
is no increase in reality whatsoever due to its being internal to that self; the self of solipsism “adds nothing
to the world, just as death takes away nothing from the world”, though what it does take away is precisely
the self of solipsism, the horizon, the limit.25
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In Valberg’s terms, death will eliminate all presence; there will be NOTHING. “The world will remain,
but there will be NOTHING” – and this cannot be relativized into there being just “NOTHING for
me”, because “what death means to us” is not any such relativized nothingness but absolute
nothingness.26 We do not, at death, just lose the world (on the contrary, the world will continue to exist
without us, which is also horrifying), but we lose the horizon enabling the world to appear – to be – at
all. It is this NOTHINGNESS as a complete absence of anything that Valberg believes we inevitably find
awful and incomprehensible.27 Death  is  not  only  awful  but  in  a  sense impossible, solipsistically
understood.28 A temptingly easy solution would be to emphasize the mortal other at this point, urging us
to take seriously the other’s horizon and its existential fragility before our own, but we should remember
(as we saw in relation to Levinas) the tendency of solipsism to return: if my horizon collapsed into
NOTHINGNESS, I would no longer have the other, either, as someone to whom I would be infinitely
responsible from within my horizon. The other needs (and, in Levinas’s language, “summons”) me, and
thus my horizon. There are no metaphysical equals here: “I alone face absolute NOTHINGNESS.”29
Only toward the end of his rich book does Valberg employ the concept of the transcendental self, which
he identifies with the “horizonal self”.30 The absence of the transcendental self amounts to the absolute
nothingness that death is. It is the transcendental self that has, and can have, no metaphysical equals. If
it did, it would simply be an object in the world.
Mark Johnston criticizes Valberg’s views in his attempt to deal with death and the self. He discusses –
with references to both the Tractatus and Valberg’s book – what he calls the “arena of presence”, at the
center of which we seem to find ourselves, his version of Valberg’s “horizon”. Unlike Valberg, he attacks
solipsism – and more generally the transcendental considerations of authors like Wittgenstein and
Valberg. Yet, the death of a given human being that just happens to be me is different, he says, from my
“ownmost” death. I cannot really imagine my ownmost death, as it is the disappearance of the “arena”.31
The problem is that the transcendental subject cannot just “disappear” from the world like any object,
or the empirical subject, can. The disappearance of the transcendental self is, again, the end of the world.
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I am not convinced that Johnston sufficiently appreciates the quite different transcendental consideration
of the matter in the Tractatus and in Valberg’s study. The transcendental subject – the center of the (my)
arena of presence – is not an object of any kind, not even an intentional object, not a thing in the actual
world or any possible world, and therefore its end is the end of the (or any) world. Only objects in the
world can have identity conditions, not the arena or the world-limiting and world-categorizing self.
While Johnston’s discussion comes close to what has been labelled the “no-self” solipsism of the
Tractatus, it avoids (question-beggingly) transcendental solipsism.32 Here  Johnston  simply  seems  to
assume (unlike Valberg) that there are many arenas of presence, not just one (mine), and that there is a
straightforward sense in which mine could disappear. The problem is whether one can even meaningfully
say this, insofar as one starts from transcendental considerations. Wittgenstein’s argument is based on a
transcendental examination of the necessary conditions for the possibility of meaning and representation;
the result of such an examination is that the world can only be limited by me (my subjectivity) in order
to be linguistically representable. In employing his vocabulary of “picking out” as applied to the Tractatus
and its metaphysical or transcendental subject – or the arena – Johnston fatally overlooks not only the
possibility but the necessity of a truly transcendental treatment of the matter. The subject of the arena
cannot be “picked out” from among others. Any picking out will inevitably take place, in Valberg’s terms,
within the (my) horizon. No horizon can be picked out; there is no meta-horizon within which to do
that.
Nevertheless, one of Johnston’s crucial ideas (preparing the ground for his overall thesis that in a sense
“the good” may literally survive death, because they are not tied to their individual personal identities) is
that the arena of presence and one’s occupying it are illusory. We are in a way hallucinating that we are
in the center of an arena of presence. We are dealing with merely intentional objects here.33 Johnston
concludes: “The real problem in principle with the idea of the resurrection of the self is that not even God
could re-create this very arena of presence. (The same could be said of your arena of presence.) God
could no more do that than he could re-create Macbeth’s dagger or any other mere intentional object.”34
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Johnston further argues that the (Buddhist) doctrine of there being no persistent self (anatta) leads to the
doctrine of agape, the commandment to take others’ interests as one’s own. The unreality of the self, allegedly
demonstrated by the argument for the illusoriness of the arena of presence, leads to the observation that
our identities are relational and relative, “Protean”, and this in turn motivates (without logically entailing)
the idea that we should take others’ interests into account as our own – and that “the good” among us
do. “A certain kind of hallucination – that of a container or arena – bounds even our veridical experience of
the world”,  Johnston  tells  us,  and  therefore  “our  selves  are  [...]  creatures  of  the  unreal.”35 The self’s
importance thus vanishes.
The agape commands us to treat ourselves as if we were arbitrary others, “albeit one whose life one is
called to live”36 – but now, who is this “one”? The transcendental subject all over again? I find Johnston’s
argument intriguing but ultimately flawed, because it commits the basic “naturalistic fallacy” of all non-
transcendental philosophies of the self, presupposing a conception of the self (or its “arena”) as an object
in a world “ready-made” prior to and independently of the self. Johnston remains a metaphysical realist
– though he does not seem to be able to get rid of the transcendental self, either, which leads to a tension
at the center of his position.
Indeed,  as Valberg puts it,  the “naturalizer” – or,  in my terminology,  the one viewing the self  from a
naturalistic, metaphysically realistic standpoint – “lacks, philosophically, a grasp of the horizonal
conception of the self”.37 Lacking such a grasp, we won’t get far in the philosophy of death, nor anywhere
else. A failure to appreciate the transcendental character of the subject existentially concerned with its
mortality leads to absurdities such as the view that one’s being able to die only “one’s own death” is no
more dramatic than one’s being able to, say, have only “one’s own haircut” or “one’s own lunch” instead
of (strictly speaking) having anyone else’s. In a trivial sense, those things are one’s own, too; we all have
our own lunches and haircuts rather than others’. But our deaths are our own in a much more pregnant
sense – a sense calling for a transcendental, even solipsistic analysis. A failure to take seriously the
transcendental dimension of the problem leads to the tendency to view everything – deaths, haircuts,
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lunches – on a par, as belonging to the same empirical nature whose metaphysical structure is fixed
independently of our subjective constitutive contribution. When that metaphysically realistic assumption
is given up, a considerably enriched picture of the special significance of one’s own mortality opens up.
The mortal transcendental subject
While there are powerful arguments in Kant himself as well as post-Kantian transcendental philosophy,
especially phenomenology and (early) Wittgenstein, that can be employed in defending a transcendentally
idealistic conception of the (mortal) subject, there is a reflexive problem that needs to be addressed. Even
the transcendental philosopher must – in order to take the phenomenon of death seriously, ontologically
and ethically – view the subject as genuinely mortal. Otherwise the idea that by removing the subject we remove
the world itself cannot be made sense of. Death must be a genuine limit to transcendental subjectivity.
(If the transcendental self itself is a limit of the world, then death is, in a not easily articulated sense, the
limit of a limit.) In other words, insofar as the transcendental self – far from being any transcendent,
otherworldly metaphysical postulation – is an aspect of our own selfhood, of me, and insofar as mortality
and the finitude it entails are necessary transcendental structures of my subjectivity, mortality and finitude
must be necessary structures of the transcendental self, too.
Arguably, then, the subject, even qua transcendental, must be “natural” (material, embodied), because
otherwise its mortality will be sacrificed. The question is whether a transcendental approach to death and
mortality, seeking to critically overcome naturalism, can recognize its own dependence on a certain kind
of naturalism. This resembles the way in which phenomenological analyses of transcendental subjectivity
are inevitably connected with, or even rooted in, the very same natural attitude that the phenomenological
method seeks to overcome. The phenomenologist studying subjectivity as something to which (to whom)
the world as natural and objective is given, bracketing the positing of the natural world, including the
subject as a natural part of the world, must in a sense begin from the natural attitude, seeking to overcome it
from within.38 The natural and the phenomenological (transcendental) attitude are reciprocally contained
13
in one another; neither is available to us without the other, and the “us” here – the subject to whom these
attitudes are available and who must move from one to the other – needs to understand its own character
as something (albeit no “thing”) that is paradoxically in constant movement between these two poles.
Similarly, when we seek to account for death transcendentally, we must understand ourselves as
transcendental subjects to whom the world is given in a way that disappears in death – yielding an end of
the world in the sense that the very givenness of the world will be eliminated – and simultaneously as
empirical parts of the world that are in such a fragile position as mere limits of the world precisely because
of their (our) material, bodily vulnerable nature. If we do not take seriously this natural, embodied
vulnerability of the transcendental subject (or the fact that bodily vulnerability is a transcendental feature
of subjectivity, as a necessary condition for the possibility of the kind of life we find ourselves living), we
fail to take seriously the fundamental transcendental outcome of our inquiry, the conception of death as
an end of the world. This could be seen as one way of cashing out Wittgenstein’s remark on the solipsistic
self’s shrinking into a point without extension and disappearing into the world (not from the world),
yielding the puzzling coincidence of solipsism and realism.39
Valberg is concerned with the same interplay between the natural (bodily, dying) and the transcendental
I have emphasized:
If right now my brain ceased to function, what would happen? There would be
NOTHING. Would the Kantian “subject of the categories” survive the NOTHINGNESS
that would be consequent upon the shutting down of my brain? Since its being depends
causally on certain things happening in my brain, the Kantian subject would cease to be.
But here the subject of the categories appears as (in Kant’s phrase) “an object of the
categories,” in particular, as an object of the category of causation.40
The causal processes in the natural world leading up to my death would eliminate the world – and there
would then be NOTHING, in Valberg’s terms. Acknowledging this is to acknowledge the dependence
of my transcendental subjectivity (“my horizon”) on worldly natural facts. But it is also to acknowledge
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the impossibility of such facts being there in the absence of my (the) horizon, i.e., the transcendental self.
There is a tension here, or almost a paradox – a specific death-related feature of the more general
“paradox of subjectivity”41 –  but  the  chief  virtue  of  Valberg’s  discussion  is  that  he  is  locating  the
fundamental problem we have to deal with as long as we are willing to engage in a transcendental inquiry
into mortality. We should avoid the metaphysically realistic naturalization of death and subjectivity into
mere objects in the world, but on the other hand we should observe that the transcendental worries
regarding finitude and mortality emerging from within our mortal condition already presuppose our
taking seriously the naturalistic prospect of the “shutting down of my brain”. Transcendental subjectivity
is a dimension of our subjectivity, which is the fully natural subjectivity of a world-involving and world-
engaging mortal creature.
Does the natural embeddedness of my subjectivity mean that metaphysical realism – understanding the
subject as a part of the world after all, of a world that exists and possesses its “own” ontological structure
independently of the subject – returns to the picture? I do not think so. For it is not exactly metaphysical
realism that returns. It is only a certain kind of realism compatible with solipsism that is needed here, and
that realism is sufficient for maintaining a (non-reductive) form of naturalism compatible with
transcendental inquiry. In Kantian-Wittgensteinian terms, we could say that transcendental idealism or
solipsism is compatible with, and even required by, empirical realism.42 When the transcendental self is
challenged to recognize its own dependence on naturalism and thereby its disappearance into the world
in a Wittgensteinian sense, it must do this by referring to the ineliminability of the transcendental self,
though. It is still me who is challenged to distinguish between the perspectives on myself as a subject and
as an object.  In this  sense,  the transcendental  self  could be seen as a never-ending spiral:  its  reflexive
reflection on its own paradoxical status as both transcendental and natural goes on forever. Death is,
then, like an axis around which the spiral circulates. In its reflection on its own double status, the self
inevitably reflects on its mortality.
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But  who  or  what  is  the  subject  that  can  (even  consider  to)  choose  to  view  itself  either  as  a  subject
(transcendentally) or as an object (naturalistically), engaging in the spiral-shaped movement? It can be
suggested that it is only in terms of a pragmatic pluralism that the required integration of the naturalist and
the transcendental perspectives on the subject and its mortality can succeed. Whether the subject – or its
death – is viewed naturalistically or transcendentally depends on our pragmatic perspective of inquiry. In
this sense, pragmatism is the primary philosophical commitment here, making possible the transcendental
reflexivity needed in the switch of perspective from the transcendental to the natural (empirical) and back
again.
It is, moreover, the pragmatist perspective that enables us to say that the transcendental and naturalist
approaches to death, dying, and mortality are mutually co-constitutive rather than individually self-
sustained. The transcendental analysis of our mortality requires a kind of naturalism, because otherwise
the finitude and embodied fragility of the transcendental subject cannot be recognized. But naturalism
by  itself  won’t  suffice,  either,  because  it  fails  to  ask  the  transcendental,  reflexive  question  about  the
existential significance of our mortal condition from within that condition itself and treats the subject as
a mere object among others. Pragmatism, then, is needed as a kind of critical “coordinator” of the
interplay of transcendental and naturalist philosophical inquiries. The transcendental method ought to be
metaphilosophically considered – and coordinated in relation to naturalistic methods – in a pragmatist
way.
Immortality and finitude
Finally, these ideas on death and subjectivity may be briefly compared to the somewhat paradoxical view
familiar from Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion, particularly D.Z. Phillips’s work, namely, that it is
only by fully endorsing the radical mortality and finitude of the self that the notion of immortality can
have any religious significance. I am not here engaging in the philosophy of religion, or dealing with
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religious conceptions of immortality or survival, but it is important to note that Phillips’s suggestion can
also – against his own self-conception – be interpreted as a (pragmatist) transcendental argument.43
Phillips maintains that the temporally infinite existence of a metaphysical soul would be no solution to
anything. Any supernaturalist metaphysics of survival is based on metaphysical realism all over again.44
The transcendental question concerning “immortality” (in an extended and perhaps metaphorical sense)
focuses on the meaningfulness vs. meaninglessness of finite human existence characterized by the
paradoxical double character of subjectivity and objectivity. True, Phillips does not call his questions or
methods “transcendental”. Even so, his insightful discussion of the way in which our discourse of the
soul becomes “dislocated” can be regarded as an extended transcendental inquiry into the way in which
certain conceptual and/or linguistic meanings become unavailable to us when we move into another
language-game, or fail to pay attention to the way a certain language-game is played. The immortality of
the soul, Phillips reminds us, cannot be equated with the continued existence of an immaterial “inner
substance called ‘the soul’” or of a disembodied spirit, and it cannot be about any such metaphysical state
of affairs captured by propositionally true or false beliefs.45 In  contrast,  “whatever  is  meant  by  the
immortality of the soul, it has to do with the eternal destiny of a human being as a whole”.46 Of course,
we may ask where exactly Phillips gets the normative force to judge certain ways of speaking of the soul
as misguided “dislocations” – not, surely, from mere empirical observations of factual language-use, nor
from any purely a priori transcendental considerations. The only method available seems to be a
Wittgensteinian grammatical examination of the ways in which certain language-games, in this case
religious ones, “work”, how expressions are correctly used within them. It is such examination that
proceeds transcendentally, leading to interesting results concerning the phenomena of death and
(im)mortality.
We should, according to Phillips, pay careful attention to the way of speaking of the soul that incorporates
the idea that “[t]o believe in the immortality of the soul is to want to give one’s soul to God”; when the
believer says farewell to her/his life s/he gives it to God and thus dies “in God”. 47 When we take seriously
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such ways of speaking and also the intimate relation between morality and the concern with immortality,48
we may appreciate the view that “[t]he most fundamental barrier to a belief in the immortality of the soul
is the desire for self-preservation”.49 When we are concerned with self-preservation, we are unable to say
farewell to life – and thus we do not take mortality seriously enough to deserve immortality. Phillips’s
suggestion to view immortality precisely as its opposite, as a full-blown acceptance of one’s finitude and
mortality without any concern to preserve one’s identity in eternity, may be religiously sophisticated but
it is hardly available to an average religious believer who does not seek resources from (transcendental)
philosophy of religion and moral philosophy. Phillips’s position amounts to a kind of non-
anthropocentrism: we are not at the center of the universe, and we should accept this fact. This comes
close to the acknowledgment of the mortality of the transcendental self – the limited character of the self
that is itself a limit. But even such a non-anthropocentric view on the self and its relation to the world is
available to us only from an anthropocentric (transcendental) perspective.
I am not saying that Phillips’s view is unproblematic. But if a mortal human being (if s/he is a religious
believer, and perhaps even if s/he isn’t) is able to view her/his life as being “answerable to God” and
thus to place one’s own death “in God’s hands”, to “see one’s death as part of the majesty of God’s
will”,50 then perhaps the transcendental inquiry into the possibilities of meaning available to us in certain
language-games has at least served the pragmatic purpose of rendering our deaths more open to some
kind of potential significance (which could also be lost). Phillips is in my view committed to something
like transcendental pragmatism when he maintains, with Wittgenstein, that “concepts have their life”
“only in practice, in what we do”.51
Conclusion
I did not raise the Phillipsian-cum-Wittgensteinian issues in the interest of endorsing them as such but
because I agree with Phillips that even our concepts of the soul and of immortality may still, in our secular
or post-secular age, have interesting possibilities of meaning that are connected with a transcendental
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analysis of our mortal condition. The transcendental approach to mortality must deal with the (moral)
hope for immortality as part of that human condition, and in doing so it must, again, start from within
our mortality itself, pragmatically switching between the transcendental and the natural. It is only within
mortality that the hope for immortality can become an issue for us.
In a reflexive undertaking of investigating the human condition, certain transcendental insights into that
condition may become manifest, or we may become open to them, analogously to the way in which
Valberg suggests that we should become open to philosophical discoveries (as well as, inevitably,
tensions) concerning, for example, the horizon and the truth of solipsism – without supposing that any
specific arguments could “establish the existence of the horizonal subject matter”.52 I  view  my  own
argumentation  as  an  attempt  to  indicate  a  way  of  becoming  open  to  some  interesting  movements  in
(actual or possible) philosophical thinking about the human condition. This is, methodologically, very
different from mainstream analytic philosophy’s unshaking belief in the superiority of the strongest
argument. In the philosophical attempt to live with our mortality, such a faith, ignoring the (pragmatist)
contextualization of even the most theoretical arguments in practical and existential circumstances of
human life, may be most pernicious.
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